9 September 1958

COPY NO. 3

DIRECTOR'S FLIMSY

on

USCINCEUR AIR CONTINGENCY PLAN BERLIN (U) Reference: J.C.S. 1907/156

(Item No. 5, OpDeps Meeting)

Attached, for your consideration, is a proposed redraft, with changes indicated, of the memorandum for the Secretary of Defense which appears at Enclosure "A" of the subject paper.



DHAFT

ENCLOSURE "A"

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: USCINCEUR Air Contingency Plan Berlin (U)


- 1. Reference is made to a memorandum* forwarded to you together with a copy of a memorandum** to USCINCEUR, subject "Guidance Concerning Air Access to Berlin", dated 7 May 1958.
- 2. In response to guidance** by the Joint Chiefs of Staff USCINCEUR submitted a U.S. Air Contingency Plan Berlin*** which has been reviewed and approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In addition, USCINCEUR has requested additional guidance in the following areas:
 - a. Recommendations for supplemental planning and implementation of subject plan including plan implementation date.
 - <u>b.</u> Latitude afforded commanders to effect immediate and aggressive protective and countermeasures, including if necessary and feasible HOT PURSUIT, in view of the proviso contained in subparagraph 4 (a), page 2, NSC 5604, dated 23 April 1956.****
 - c.Degree and order of magnitude of U.S. limited military force (air) action authorized to counter Soviet and/or German Democratic Republic (GDR) restrictions on U.S. air access to Berlin.
- 3. In view of the implications concerning U.S. national security involved in the implementation of USCINCEUR'S Air Contingency Plan, it is considered that the guidance provided USCINCEUR should be a final U.S. position_developed-by-the Department-of-State-in-senjunction-with-the-Department-of-Defense
- 4. In developing the <u>final</u> U.S. position with-the-Department ef-State the following considerations and recommendations concerning implementing guidance are furnished:

^{*} Enclosure "A" to J.C.S. 1907/154

a. Implementation of the testing of intentions phase of USCINCEUR'S Air Contingency Plan should will be made at an appropriate date which is advantageous to the United States in achieving its cold war objectives. An early date is recommended due to the recent advent of the C-130 aircraft into the European theater and the fact that any delay in the initiation of the proposed flights above 10,000 feet would only tend to weaken our position.

b. Based upon the introduction of turboprop type aircraft (C-130) into USAFE, the USSR, through the Berlin Air Safety Center, should will be notified of contemplated flights into the Berlin corridors in excess of altitudes normally flown by propeller type aircraft. This notification should will be made with sufficient advanced warning to provide the Soviets/GDR an opportunity to revise their communications and air control procedures. The exact date of the initial flight should would not be given, but they should will be notified that en-and after a specified date it is the intention of the United States to conduct flights within the Berlin air corridors as set forth above. However, the initial flights should will be conducted under Visual Flight Rules. After initial visual flights, instrument flights above 10,000 feet would will be initiated.

- c. NSC 5604 provides appropriate U.S. policy guidance for HOT-PURSUIT. The question of the proviso contained in subparagraph 4 (a) of NSC 5604 is based on a situation in which a definite pattern of continued interference with or attacks on U.S. aircraft is encountered in areas outside Communist control. Prior to the definite establishment of such a pattern, the intentions of the Soviets or the GDR would have been determined, and the subject policy would have, of necessity, been reviewed.
- d. The degree and order of magnitude of U.S. military air action in this situation is dependent upon the reaction of the Soviets and/or the Garman Democratic Republic. If the



USSR and/or the GDR were to establish a complete air blockade of the Berlin Air Corridors, full use of their jet
fighters, antiaircraft weapons, and electronic countermeasures might be required. Hostile acts of the magnitude
required to establish a complete air blockade weuld will
indicate that general war was is probably imminent and the
action to be taken by USCINCEUR under such circumstances
weuld will be directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

- e. USCINCEUR should be delegated the authority to determine the air effort appropriate to cope with possible contingencies other than a complete air blockade of the Berlin air corridors.
- f. Supplemental planning should cover AAA firing by the Soviet or GDR on allied aircraft from positions above ground located within or outside the corridor. It is considered that the HOT PURSUIT policy contained in NSC 5604 should be extended to include retaliatory action by combat aircraft against the AAA units concerned.
- 5. The Joint Chiefs of Staff request that they be informed of the final U.S. position on the above recommendations at an early date.